Abstract: This paper considers the economics of digitalisation, defined as the digital coding of information and the growing productivity gains in processing and transmission it enables. It examines the effects of this process on existing models of the firm, industry structure and innovation. The diffusion and adoption of digital innovations are then illustrated by the example of the automobile industry. This sector offers instructive insights since it played a crucial role in the history of industrial innovation and competitive business models.
Introduction
The concept of innovation comes from the idea of newness, of jamais vu, something never seen before. We speak freely of technological 'change', technological 'rupture', 'radical' innovation, all ways of underlining the dimension of newness, essential to the economy because it is constituent of its relationship with time (see Schumpeter's work and his idea of the creative destruction associated with innovation). From 1998 to 1999, the expression 'new economy' spread, first in the USA, then rapidly across the whole world, to describe the industrial, commercial and financial phenomena linked to information technology (IT), the internet and the web. Since then, and more particularly after the dotcom crisis of spring 2000, an animated debate has developed between partisans and adversaries of this idea. This controversy is significant because it raises the question of the nature and effects of the innovations associated with IT. A crucial point is to identify the scale and extent of the newness disseminated by IT [1] . Does it concern the entire economy, specific activity sectors or even a small group of firms? Does this novelty factor only correspond to a phenomenon, the spread of IT and digitalisation, or does it go so far as to affect the economic science itself and its usual concepts and theories?
A rigorous discussion of these issues demands a clarification of the concepts and economic mechanisms at work. A difficulty arises from the commonly accepted double dimension of digitalisation: technical and economic. In this way, the intensification of computer and communication means is not enough in itself to trigger economic innovation. Actually, businesses have massively deployed IT for their internal management over the last 10-15 years (e.g. digitalisation of stock orders, EDI data exchanges) without upsetting the economic representations of the firms or markets. The reverse is also true: putting the economic effects on a few emblematic uses such as electronic commerce, the web or the internet is reductive. These concepts speak in fact as much of choice and interpretations as of the origin and nature of the transformations in play. The case of electronic commerce is particularly enlightening: beyond its descriptive function (commercial transactions relying on electronic communications) this term had been progressively used as a generic concept indicating an immense market opportunity apt for the creation of new firms (dotcoms) and the emergence of a new industry.
In fact, this overall approach only made sense if articulated with a set of implicit economic hypotheses, which are rarely exposed and debated: massive reduction in transaction costs, decisive competitive advantage to the first entry, assimilation of the internet as a media, etc. The dotcom stock debacle of 2000 -insomuch as it served as a triggering mechanism -shows that this 'vision' of e-commerce was but a mirage, an erroneous representation incapable of structuring the analysis of new business and competition models, in short, of the overall transformation of the economy resulting from IT.
The weakness of the economic commerce assumption was to focus on the internet as an alternative means of distribution in order to derive its impact on the economy [2] . This approach did not allow the understanding of the effects of digitalisation outside the web, such as
• the computerisation of production and products
• the use of numerous information channels (telephone, web, e-mail, minitel, cell-phones, TV, smart cards) independent of a particular technology
• applications other than distribution.
And yet, whatever the means or use, what will be decisive in the industry from now on is the intensification of the information exchanges between economic agents.
Information technologies, technical innovation, and digitalisation
The approach developed here starts with the concept of digitalisation, defined as the digital codification of information allowing its process and transmission by machines with fast increasing productivity. Yet, information is at the heart of industrial economics' theories, which justify the existence of firms by transaction costs [3] and analyse accordingly markets, competition and pricing. Digitalisation is the product of a wave of technological innovations that provoked a spectacular fall in the price of information processing, storage and transmission. Its techno-economic fundamentals are well known and documented. In a manner unprecedented in industrial history, a group of products (processors, mass storage, fibre-optics, switches) has over a lengthy period (40 years for the processors) experienced exponential growth in performance, coupled with stability or even a reduction in the cost of unit production. This first aspect manifests Moore's famous law. Initially formulated in 1965, and empirically validated by the evolution of the industry over the following decades, it states that the performance of integrated circuits (microprocessors and random access memory) will double every 18 months. A similar dynamics is observable in mass storage and fibre optics (the transmission capacity of an optical fibre has regularly doubled every year for the last decade), although the technologies and the physical principles involved are largely different.
However, this extraordinary technical progression only gained its full dimension when connected with a second phenomenon: the stabilisation and even reduction in the cost of fabrication. It is the rapid growth of the market and the output produced which offers the key to this second factor. The improvement of PCs and portable computers, the multiplication of fixed and mobile telecom networks generated a strong increase in demand, transforming computer, software, routers and other switches into mass consumer goods, produced by the millions. As these industries are characterised by the weight of their fixed costs contrasting with much lighter variable costs (quasi-nil in the case of software), an increase in volume automatically translates into a reduction in the average cost of production. This effect has more than compensated for the cost of the continuous improvement in the performances and the quality of the products. Together, these two factors account for the origin of the exceptional gains in productivity opened up by digitalisation.
The evolution has been no less spectacular in the telecom networks. The combination of innovations in equipment and software (signal compression, wavelength multiplexing [4] , optical amplifiers, etc.) has allowed exponential gains in transmission speed and signal routing, and in the infrastructure capacity. The cost of telecom equipment remaining relatively stable, transmission and communication represent impressive productivity gains in the treatment and storage of information. Finally, the connectivity factor must be mentioned. The possibility of combining continuous improvements of treatment and data transmission on the new digital networks should be considered as the decisive innovation of digitalisation. The development of the internet, of IP interfaces and applications, the improvement of HTML language, the World Wide Web and the first search engines, as well as the proliferation of access providers, have been the driving forces behind the stunning spread of this connectivity. Local access, which links the user's computer to very high broadband telecom networks, remains the crucial link. In the professional field, Ethernet technology has picked up this challenge with the construction of local broadband networks. For individual access, the progression in performance has been much slower, so much so as to represent for many the main 'bottleneck' in IT distribution and the digitalisation process of the economy.
Digitalisation, industrial organisation, and businesses
Digitalisation, therefore, is leveraged by the mutualisation through the worldwide connectivity of the huge productivity gains offered by a succession of technical innovations in computer and telecom networks. By way of example, DeLong [5] estimates that the raw power of automatic calculation available worldwide underwent an annual rate of growth of 86% between 1960 and 2000. If we consider such figures, the amplitude of these transformations is without historical precedent. DeLong usefully reminds us that during the three great technological revolutions that clearly established new economies (the English agriculture in the seventeenth century, the industrial revolution of the first half of the nineteenth century in the UK, and the second US industrial revolution) the rate of growth of the key indicators in the driving sectors were far from equalling the performances observed in computers and telecommunications.
However, the long-term impact of these innovations in information technologies remains a largely open and controversial question. Between 1998 and 2000, the economic debate was concentrated on the role played by information technology in the performance of the US economy (longest period of growth since the 1960s, restrained inflation, and especially since 1995, an acceleration in work productivity). The characteristics of this growth are effectively the main index put forward by certain individuals to justify the term 'new economy'. Macro-economic studies establish that, at the same time, the production of IT and its use throughout the industries pull the acceleration of the overall productivity of the American economy [6] . However, beyond this macro-economic data, the very mechanisms of IT diffusion in different sectors and businesses (what we call digitalisation) still remain poorly known and little explored.
By concentrating principally on the internet, common analysis also privileged the expected reduction in transaction costs associated with the production and distribution of goods and services, and the promise of a division by a factor of five to a 100 of the unit cost, depending on the sector. That said, these potential gains only sketch a very partial view of the economic processes at work. From our standpoint, the main issue is that any interaction between economic actors (consumers, distributors, producers, and suppliers) generates information, which is, from now on, digitised. It is afterwards possible to store it, to treat it in a database, to transmit it with no cost or additional formatting to diverse applications employed by the firm's production, marketing, logistic and accounting departments.
Digitalisation signals a profound transformation in the classical view of the economic transaction. From isolated, anonymous, instant and standardised, it is becoming more and more repeated, transparent (public knowledge of the parties in play), continuous and customised or dedicated. Even though all the practical applications are still far from being systematically exploited, this perspective is already inspiring numerous reflections and preparatory work. One of the most abundantly underlined effects of this intensification of informational flux is the reversal of perspective profiting the consumer. But whereas the consequences are first drawn in terms of marketing or business strategy, it is important to underline the implications of this argument on the economic representations of the firm and its competition.
In the classical version, synthesised by Coase in 'The Nature of the Firm' [3] , the firm is presented as a place of coordination, an 'island', in the midst of millions of isolated and anonymous individuals, the 'ocean' of the market. The digitalisation of information stands this perspective on its head. The consumers, as discrete individuals, emerge from the smooth surface of the market. Each among them is becoming from now on a little market to be conquered. For once, the firm controls consumer access -locked-in by substantial exit costs and loyalty incentive schemes -it potentially masters the interface between this individual and the overall commercial sphere. On this basis, it can offer new or enlarged products and services, innovate, etc. This privileged bilateral relationship can be built and spread on very different foundations (starting with the product, but equally the brand name and the reputation associated with it, customer payment tools and billing, and finally, access to communication channels).
The consequence of the above on industrial organisation is the development of what we suggest to call the firm C. Here C designates the Customer and refers to the intervening inflection and the particular properties of a given group of firms. Naturally, this designation in itself neither defines the nature of the firm nor pretends to create a new typology of enterprise. The goal is more to identify certain organisational economic characteristics associated with the intensified circulation of information in the enterprise [7] . Digitalisation, as we have seen, allows the systematic collection, treatment and storage of information within the firm. Even so, the accumulation of information does not guaranty its effective and profitable use. Firm C must develop an organisation, resources and tools to effectively exploit its relations with its clients and to build up a durable competitive advantage with it. In the space of five years, around this need and its strategic evolution, a new industry has developed with very rapid growth.
The 'customer relations management' gathers together various methods and tools under the name CRM (for customer management relationship): relational bases of unified data, data extraction software (data mining), research engines, intranet and extranet [8] . Their function is to help businesses to manage their sales forces, marketing actions and follow after-sale services via a single database. In spite of the diversity of the technical offer and, often, considerable expense, truly successful experiments remain rare and incomplete. The obstacles which have been encountered are in fact quite numerous: the necessity of prior reorganisation within the enterprise, internal cooperation between departments, still-experimental technical tools which become rapidly obsolete, the great sensitivity of applications to data quality and to the architecture of the information in the unified customer database. However, the dynamism and growth of the CRM industry, as well as the massive investments incurred by the enterprises bring, in our opinion, concrete evidence of an evolution towards the firm C. Logically, the sectors playing, at the same time, the roles of driving force and experimental field in this domain are telecommunications and finance, based around applications centred, respectively, on the management of the rate of consumer defection and client risk.
Within this movement of business redefinition around customer relations, the internet then appears clearly as a tool, albeit one with extraordinary potential, but also one which participates as part of a larger ensemble. This is so because the internet on its own cannot pretend to give a firm a supportable competitive advantage over its industry rivals [9] . By itself, this technology cannot generate sufficient exit barriers. One can even defend the idea that it is easier to copy and imitate web innovations because they cannot be effectively protected. In addition, the internet quickly ceases to be a differentiating factor as soon as all enterprises and consumers use this technology equally. In order to comprehend the true implications of the internet on competition, industry structures and business strategies, one must place oneself within an analysis framework aiming to construct a comparative advantage from the management of customer relations.
Case study: the innovation of digitalisation in the auto industry
This framework of analysis can now serve to read through the history of the automobile industry as to bring to light the role of innovations in digitalisation. The birth of the automotive industry was marked by two major inventions: by Henry Ford, symbolised by the Model T, and by Alfred Sloan, President of General Motors, tied to the introduction of interior driving. These two inventions, as we shall see, are before all else of an economic nature. They spread across the rest of the industry throughout the twentieth century and then on an even larger scale with the advent of digitalisation.
Fordism first deals with standardisation. With the introduction of the Model T (1908), it touched upon the central function of the automobile, that of the engine, as well as the rest of the product. 'Making cars,' said Henry Ford [10] "is to make cars that are all the same just like one pin resembles another coming out of the pin factory." Fordism therefore extends to the industrial process: the standardisation of tasks and the scientific organisation of work in factories give rise to strong economy of scale and gains in productivity. Up to the middle of the 1920s, the total productivity of factors in the automobile followed two figures, in accordance with the equipment market. The rapid saturation of the market and the exhaustion of the scale economies (1925) (1926) opened the way to Sloanism.
Sloanism introduced differentiation in utility functions (liveability, comfort, mechanical performances, etc.) and in the domain of style. With four-door sedans, coupes, and convertibles, Sloan created economies of range and the dynamics of obsolescence indispensable to the renewal of the market. The mechanical components became invisible. Sloan's firm erased the pin factory. It was a 'blackbox' from which flowed products for segmented markets.
Standardisation and differentiation drove automobile industry growth until the 1980s. Models followed one after the other, thanks to style and new functions, while, now, banal functions and production methods became standardised. An essential element of this combination was the possibility of escape from an exclusive logic of productivity elevation and cost reduction. Functional innovation allowed for the maintaining and even raising of prices. The oligopolistic sharing of growth between a few large firms, the partitioning of regional markets and the technical constraints (productivity-oriented and functional) of innovation justified a highly integrated organisation. The added value of manufacturers then passed 50%. The innovation applied, as much to products (style, opening of new functions, standardisation of basic functions) as to production (process standardisation), resulted in time delays and development costs that only the sale of several million units could render profitable.
The petroleum crises of the 1970s, the slowing of growth and the entrance on the world market of Japanese manufacturers intensified competition along two lines [11] .
• utility functions, notably fuel consumption, but also security (shock resistance, brakes), anti-corrosion, traffic congestion, recyclability
• the industrial organisation, which had to adapt to market fluctuations, regional demand patterns, and an increasing variety of products.
As the engine functions became saturated (i.e. lost their power of differentiation), other utility functions gained in importance. The first digital innovations emerged from this functional competition. This introduced more and more electronics, first for consumption control (fuel injection), then for the ensemble of automatic functions associated with utility: braking, suspension, steering, liveability, controls, etc. By automating these functions, i.e. by optimising them by electronic servo-control, the car became digitised. In 1985, electronic accounted for less than 2% of cars in Europe and less than 5% in the USA. It is today evaluated at 15-20% to which must be added the gains in microprocessor productivity. Digitalisation also affects standardisation. Computer assisted conception, the introduction of robots and computer production workshop models allows for the discovery of scale economies on shorter and linked series. Digitalisation finally follows the trails blazed by Ford and Sloan: it affects, on the one hand, the optimisation of production methods and standard function performance, and on the other, the creation of new utilities (greater diversity of models, interior atmosphere conditioning, theft protection, localisation and guidance). At the end of the 1980s, this progression of digital technologies brought forth the question of the relationship between manufacturers and electronic métiers. Bosch's monopoly on fuel injection systems was frightening. Schematically, the problem was as follows: since it is the mastery of open (unsaturated) functions which gave manufacturers the advantage of differentiation, and since electronics optimise old functions and allow the creation of new ones, should western automobile manufacturers, in the manner of the aviation industry and Japanese conglomerates, become electricians?
General Motors (GM) responded by buying Hughes in 1985. The very same year, Chrysler bought Gulfstream Aerospace, while British Aerospace (BA) took control of Rover. This integration was expensive however, because in order to develop digital innovations, it was necessary to conceive and manufacture the ensembles of functions. Yet, in an erratic and competitive market, integrated activities were a source of fixed costs, which amplified the fluctuations in results. Disintegration rapidly took over [12] . The head of Chrysler, Lee Iacocca [13] explained his desire to concentrate on the automobile: "The market for cars and commercial vehicles will be fiercely competitive in the years to come and the only way to succeed in such an environment is to concentrate all our energy and resources on satisfying our customer's needs."
This proposition, at the origin of Chrysler's rebirth, followed by most of the manufacturers whose added value rate descended to less than 30%, indicates a new industrial philosophy.
Digitalisation entails such a rhythm of functional innovations that the manufacturer must subcontract the control to specialised equipment manufacturers. The car company therefore becomes a designer-assembler supplying itself from a market of functions. As for the equipment manufacturers, they take up the industrial dynamics of Ford and Sloan, becoming OEM's (Original Equipment Manufacturers) and sell their own innovations to manufacturers under their own brand names. This evolution of industrial organisation towards a vast broken up network highlights the importance of transaction costs. It is important to note that the proliferation of functions and associated options provokes an explosion in the variety of the offer (of the mix) of the manufacturers. During the launch of a new catalogue in 2001, Louis Schweitzer, CEO of Renault, evoked a mix of a million different models, according to different possible equipment combinations, finishing, colours, etc. A million different possibilities per model are no longer a range, but a wide and continuous spectrum.
The management of diversity and storage in the distribution network increases differentiation. The inability to dispatch a large variety towards demanding customers is a source of inefficiencies in traditional distribution channels [14] . The meeting of an overstocked model and a weak willingness-to-pay for an unchosen product, inevitably provokes discounts and, in the end, the complete overhaul of the distribution system and price. This evolution renders definitively, obsolete, the representation of the firm, commonly accepted since Adam Smith: the 'pin factory', even renamed blackbox because of differentiation.
In fact, it is no longer the transformation of product input, however diverse they may be, that justifies the firms' existence, but rather, the dynamic management of transactional processes with its suppliers, backers, employees and, above all, its customers. In other words, with so many suppliers, references, products and clients, the survival of the firm, the reason for its very existence, is no longer the sale of what it produces, but its capability of delivering what the customer ordered at an acceptable price, before he has the chance to change his mind. The manufacturers thus face the challenge to move from managing a network of dealers (that are also blackboxes of distribution aiming at disposing of inventories) to organising a network of customers through distribution and information channels. This challenge is particularly uneasy because the inventories pushing the sales directly result from the economies of scale in the car assembly. And therefore, the attempts to reverse this production push into a consumer pull may result in losing economies of scale. However, the manufacturer has little choice: if he does not improve the matching of the growing diversity of cars with their accurate customers, he will destroy willingness-to-pay, brand value and price margins [15] .
The firm therefore tends to become a 'network', i.e. a network of customers to be captured and rendered loyal. From now on, it is this constraint (largely founded on information management) that drives industrial innovations. It is still too soon to say what the final consequences of this transformation will be. We know how the handling of the internet as an emblem of digitalisation was able to inspire utopian visions. We are going nonetheless to propose several ways, whilst recognising that we are dealing with profound, long-term phenomenon, connected (albeit less intuitively) to the dynamics of standardisation and differentiation initiated by Ford and Sloan. In particular, the end of the 'blackbox' does not signal the complete and instantaneous disappearance of the production and distribution structures of this paradigm. One cannot suppress from one day to the next the system of automobile distribution (including stocks in car dealerships, incentives distributed to dealers and marketing efforts to push the cars in distribution channels, that represent an average 30% of a car total cost). The economic stake for digitalisation is the progressive transformation of these structures into firm Cs, into networks. It is, therefore, not sufficient to merely reduce the transaction costs. It is also necessary to offer new functions valorised by the consumer.
The first way is the economic model inaugurated by Dell: fabrication on demand (build-to-order). Remarking that the functional modules of computers were extremely standardised, Michael Dell began to construct PCs to measure in his dormitory at the University of Texas. At that time Dell invented the first firm C in the computer sector, i.e. aligning the productive system to the firm-customer informational relationships. In less than 15 years, with a digital distribution network, he surpassed all his competitors in the assembly and sale of PCs. His innovation, already present in the textile industry, was the creation of a brand of manufactured products starting from the distribution side. Fine and Raff [16] explain that the viability of the model rests on the extraordinary pace of innovation in the OEMs (processors, memories and peripherals), guaranteeing the assembler to always be able to sell to an addicted clientele the products coming from his suppliers. In other words, Dell was able to quickly sell the parts he bought because the assembly was simple, his costs were recuperated rapidly and his functional innovation greatly anticipated. These characteristics are difficult to apply to the automobile industry because it is the assembler who manages the style functions that drive the renewal. These entail long cycles (four to five years as compared to 12 months in computers and telecommunications) because they modify the assembly schemes, the interfaces of OEM functions, and pull the capitalistic intensity and the break-even points upwards. In other words, if build-to-order seems able to reduce the inefficiency of distribution of products of ever-growing variety, it remains unsure that it can be applied to all areas of automobile production. Nonetheless, it is in the best interest of manufacturers to reduce delays in conception as well as OEM transaction costs in such a way as that the offers, with their ever-growing performances, become more and more standardised [17] . This tendency gives place to digital innovations that reduce transaction costs (collaborative design, automatic OEM stand-by, buying segmentation according the nature and costs of transaction, market places).
The second track is the introduction of new service functions. An evolution in lifestyles has brought forth new utilities associated with different types of automobile use. The car is no longer perceived as a mere object but also as a service, which the service provider can equally well be the manufacturer or a specialised intermediary (licensee, renter, travel agent, financier) capable of delivering the best expected offer. Manufacturers already propose long-term rental offer with automatic renewal and vehicle replacement in case of a change in use. Such offers, which are to be discerned from leasing (the sale of a vehicle on credit) because it is a pure service (admittedly car-based), require an industrial organisation, a network, adapted to the circulation of furnished vehicles (shares, stock exchanges). The sale of services will fragment the automobile market even more and give rise to more and more intense information exchanges between consumers and firms. The competition or the coopetition (cooperation-competition) for these services is no longer only between manufacturers, but rather between large networks managing customer accounts. Innovation in this sector is economic by nature, driven by marketing of services.
This last remark opens a third track, that of networks (and eventually new firms) capable of detecting utilities and the corresponding willingness-to-pay. Even though the massive sales of cars by the internet remains a utopia and an 'automobile Dell' (i.e. the entry of a new brand through distribution) is quite unlikely, the amplitude of inefficiencies in historical distribution opens the field to 'infomediaries' (informational intermediaries) capable of guiding consumers toward offers adapted to their profiles [18] . For example, comparative sites exist that prepare the customer's purchase before directing them to a brand. Others, stock reduction specialists, bring savings-hungry customers to dealerships. These infomediaries would create networks related to traditional firms whose efficiency they will improve. Their goal is to finally integrate themselves into the large service networks (banks, insurance companies, big distribution, rental companies, manufacturers) to which they will bring customers, products and craftsmanship. In the meantime, they continue to develop by experimentation and form the active front of economic innovation for the transformation of the blackbox into what we have called a firm C.
Conclusion
The automobile industry has always been a key laboratory for economic science. It is there that standardisation and differentiation have been deployed on an industrial scale. Their combination still drives the dynamic of numerous industries. Inserted into this process, for the last 20 years, digitalisation has transformed this coupling, turning the control and the exploitation of flux of information into the core of industrial activity. Digitalisation widens the range of differentiation and brings more diversity into production. Therefore it enhances market discrimination so to match the differentiated product with its willing-to-pay consumer. In the case of automobile, digitalisation has turned the car into a versionnable product, which needs to address the proper consumer. From that perspective, e-commerce (infomediaries) appears more like a consequence than a cause of digitalisation. E-commerce has rapidly occurred in the car industry because digitalisation has created the need for a better matching [15] .
This analysis has various implications regarding corporate strategy in the auto market and the resulting industry structure:
• The reorientation of the production on design and assembly instead of integrated fabrication. The consequence is an intensification of the information flows between the assembler and its OEMs' network so to get strong innovation dynamics and market reactivity. The ongoing development of integrated ERPs should result in an informational (or digital) re-integration of the production side.
• The increased segmentation of the market between discount-driven consumers using the car as an input or a commodity, and consumers looking for utility in the form of specific functions and services.
• The specialisation of distribution networks on those different segments. The commodity segment helps the assembler to generate economies of scale. On this segment, in line with the traditional blackbox model, distribution will remain strongly 'pushed' by production.
Accordingly, various models are emerging so to detect utilities and convey to the consumer the adequate version of the product. Rental companies offer disintegrated model of such networks. They add a rental customised service to a commodity car. Infomediaries, disintegrated or not, suggest another model. The re-integration of their urban selling networks by some European automobile companies (Renault, Daimler-Benz) may also lead to the surge of new 'car centres' concepts. Those 'branded car centres' (such as the Smart Centres selling the Daimler-Benz micro-car) able to show the widest range of models and to provide all kind of information and user experience, should not be only aimed at cutting distribution costs through economies of scale. They will mainly focus on improving the matching of the versions so to raise the prices and the retail margins. This phenomenon clearly goes beyond the mere spread of the internet and its controversial impact on productivity and commerce. Digitalisation has indeed a different scale: it fundamentally changes the economic representations of the products, the markets and the firms. The product becomes a versionnable content, a utility platform. The various kinds of desirable utilities therefore structure distinct sub-markets. Those markets are then addressed through specialised networks able the get the best value of each utility. And, of course, the firms have to cope with this new paradigm. What we have formerly described as the firm C might probably be an over-integrated vision of what is (will be) really happening. The automobile example shows that while the manufacturing brand concentrates the content, the distribution networks, whether integrated or not, could eventually specialise in delivering specific customised utility. Since the blackbox is over and pure convergence unveiled as another costly utopia, many combinations of contents and networks have yet to be experimented.
